War, combined operations have been largely ignored. He is rightly critical of the single other book devoted to the subject, Rowena Reed's Combined Operations in the Civil War (fi rst published in 1978), which is deeply fl awed in that it is largely a paean to General McClellan. Reed reached the unusual conclusion that, had Union leaders only followed McClellan's strategy, the war would have been won in 1862.
As Symonds notes in his introductory essay, there was no tradition of combined operations at the start of the war. Despite the experiences of the War of 1812 and the Mexican-American War (1846-48), training manuals failed to address the subject, and the army and naval departments had no means of eff ecting cooperation. Each service jealously guarded its own independence, and offi cers of one service were under no obligation to accept orders from offi cers of another. They also tended to ignore diff erences in rank. President Abraham Lincoln was the only person on the Union side who actually had command authority over both army and navy and could order cooperation. His presence at Hampton Roads in the spring of 1862 led to his "suggestion" of an operation against Sewall's Point that brought the capture of Norfolk.
Success in combined operations rested largely on individual army and navy commanders working in harmony. Where this occurred, and where there was sound planning and adequate support, success was likely. Without close cooperation, defeat invariably followed, as in the Red River campaign and at Fort Fisher. At Fort Fisher in December 1864, Rear Admiral David D. Porter and Major General Benjamin Butler were at loggerheads and the Union landing came to naught. Yet the replacement of Butler with Brigadier General Alfred H. Terry, who worked closely with Porter, brought success at that same location only a few weeks later. This is a fascinating little book, and Symonds and his coauthors have gone a long way to giving Union combined operations their due. Union Combined Operations in the Civil War is a cautionary tale that should be required reading for the U.S. military. Only 151 pages of text, it is a quick read, especially as its chapters are uniformly well written. If he is not already at work on such, Symonds might want to consider a book of similar size and format that would explore Union operations in the western and trans-Mississippi West theaters.
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